ABSTRACT
For many ages to come the old Adam will be so strong in us that everybody will need to do some work if he is to be contented. We 
INTRODUCTION
As Vox journalist Dylan Matthews wrote, "Basic income is having a moment." Basic income is an unconditional-no strings attached-cash transfer, 2 made to all citizens or residents of a country. Once merely an academic idea, today " [t] he governments of Finland, Ontario, and Utrecht are all launching tests of the policy proposal." Moreover, "The charity GiveDirectly is set to give basic 3 incomes to 6,000 people in Kenya, and the tech industry powerhouse Y Combinator is funding an experiment evaluating the idea." In its largest advance INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:473 prize winning economists have signaled their support for the policy.
12
For supporters, basic income does several things: it eliminates poverty; counters rising income inequality; non-paternalistically promotes freedom because recipients are free to use their basic income in whatever way they deem appropriate, in contrast to traditional means-tested and in-kind welfare state policies; and it offers a solution to what many fear is the approaching apocalypse of technological unemployment. Central to its appeal-and this Article-basic income eliminates dependence on the labor market and makes possible meaningful lives not dictated by market imperatives.
The goal of this Article is to compare basic income with another policy: the 13 regulation of working hours. The novel contribution is that, despite initial Besides this comparative analysis, this Article also contends that workingtime regulation is a superior alternative to basic income. Not only do basic income and working-hours regulation fulfill similar normative aspirations, but regulation possesses most, if not all, of the advantages of basic income and few of its disadvantages. In addition, the advantages of basic income are perhaps not 21 as great as proponents believe. Furthermore, untested and untried to any serious extent anywhere in the world, basic income faces very real issues of both economic and political feasibility. As an alternative to basic income, this Article 22 proposes a simple extension of an already existing policy solution: the regulation of maximum working hours. This Article will compare basic income and working-hours regulation along several dimensions. But one point of comparison deserves special mention:
12. Matthews, supra note 2 ("Nobel prize winning economists like Christopher Pissarides and Joseph Stiglitz have gotten on board recently as well.").
13. equality. Basic income is almost always put forward as an egalitarian policy, one that can directly, dramatically, and even efficiently redress poverty and economic inequality. Yet, although basic income may indeed ameliorate income 23 inequality-though, as I will note, there are limitations here, too-it may actually exacerbate social inequality. There is much more to equality than simply the distribution of income. And in these aspects, basic income may do more harm than good. In contrast, working-hours regulation will-perhaps surprisingly-do much more to reduce social inequalities than will basic income. This claim may constitute the strongest argument in favor of choosing the regulation of working time over basic income.
Besides their overlooked comparability, there are several other reasons to analyze basic income and working-time regulation in conjunction. One reason is to contribute to a larger debate about the choice between the legal system and the tax system to accomplish distributive or egalitarian objectives. This choice 24 comes in several versions, but they can be summarized by the sentiment that to reduce inequality, markets should be left alone, and taxes and transfers should be the sole means of redistribution. For example, the political philosopher John Rawls wrote, "once a suitable minimum is provided by transfers, it may be perfectly fair that the rest of total income be settled by the price system." 25 Similarly, in a famous article, legal economists Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell make an efficiency argument that the tax system, rather than the legal system, should be the sole method for redistributing income. Basic income-a pure tax- 26 and-transfer scheme-and working-hours regulation-a classic market regulating mechanism-typify this choice. By demonstrating the advantages of workinghours regulation, this Article challenges conventional wisdom and concludes that the legal system can indeed be a more compelling choice than the tax system.
Another reason for comparing basic income and working-hours regulation is that such a contrast contributes to the discussion about policy choice under political and, specifically, democratic constraints. Much-especially academic-discussion about policy is overly philosophical, focusing on fundamental normative principles. But many non-normative constraints also influence what policies are possible-not just desirable. These include political 23. See infra Part III.B. Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125 , 1127 STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994) .
See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to
INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:473 institutions, political capital, path dependencies, and institutional complementarities, to name but a few. For example, as a large political literature suggests, how countries regulate financial markets depends a lot on how they regulate labor markets. Therefore, however much we may find a piece of financial regulation normatively attractive, implementing that regulation may depend-positively-on the nature of surrounding rules, institutions, and interests.
27
Basic income and working-time regulation gives us a good example of this problem. On an abstract philosophical level, these policies are not necessarily substitutes. That is, there is no particular normative reason why a country could not have both basic income and stricter regulation of working time. Indeed, there are some authors who have argued precisely for both. Nevertheless, 28 existing constraints-limits in political capital, political feasibility, path dependency, etc.-may make such a choice necessary. In particular, basic income represents a quite novel, "disruptive" and "post-industrial" approach to welfare reform. Working-time regulation-which in some fashion already exists in every developed country-is far more consistent with welfare-state policy as it currently exists. Consequently, basic income may generate substantial tensions with the existing institutional environment of mature welfare states. To the extent that this is true-and makes each policy institutional if not normative substitutes-this Article offers some reasons for why working-time regulation can be preferred to basic income. Furthermore, this Article should not be read as a rejection of basic income as a policy proposal by itself. As will be seen, there is much to be said in favor of basic income. Nevertheless, the choice becomes relevant and compelling in light of both the possibility of institutional constraints and the fact that basic income and working-hours regulation address similar normative objectives across a number of dimensions.
Part I of this Article surveys a basic income proposal and explores the parameters of the basic-income idea and how it differs from other welfare-state and tax-and-transfer policies. Part II discusses working-time regulation as it currently exists, explores its history-which will illuminate the sometimes changing normative justifications for working-hours regulation-and examines proposals for extension and reform. Part III constitutes the main analysis of the Article. It investigates the comparability of basic income and working-hours regulation along seven different dimensions: (1) the implications of each proposal for individual liberty, (2) their consequences for equality, (3) the ways they address the problem of technological unemployment, (4) how each policy impacts 27. This approach to studying basic income draws the same distinction and observation made by Ian Shapiro about the study of democracy. He writes, "Normative and explanatory theories of democracy grow out of literatures that proceed, for the most part, on separate tracks, largely uninformed by one another. This is unfortunate, partly because speculation about what ought to be is likely to be more useful when informed by the employment relationship, (5) how "universal" each policy is, (6) how economically efficient each proposal is, and (7) each policy's implication for the environment. Following this analysis, the Article concludes.
I. A BASIC INCOME PROPOSAL
Philippe Van Parijs, perhaps the best-known academic advocate of basic income, defines it as "an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement." As income it 29 is paid in cash, rather than in kind, "without any restrictions as to the nature or timing of the consumption or investment it helps fund." This is a contrast to 30 current welfare policy which, through food stamps or housing grants, effectively provides benefits in kind. Another distinctive feature of this income grant is that it is paid on some regular basis, rather than as a one-time endowment.
31
A basic income is paid by some political community. However, this entity need not be a nation state. For example, it could be paid by a sub-national 32 political unit (e.g., Alaska rather than the U.S. Government) or a supra-national political unit (e.g., the European Union). Furthermore, it need not be paid out 33 of tax revenues. For instance, financing basic income could be done out of a 34 sovereign wealth fund (e.g., Alaska again, which pays a dividend scheme funded out of part of the return on a diversified investment fund financed by royalties on Alaskan oil fields ).
35
Basic income is also paid to "all of its members. instance, members are part of a larger household, in recognition of the fact that the per capita cost of living is smaller in larger households. This is one feature that distinguishes basic income from otherwise closely-related proposals for guaranteed minimum income.
40
Central to the idea of basic income is its claim to universality. As such,
41
basic income is not conditioned on one's level of income, and rich and poor alike receive it in the same amount. This is another feature that distinguishes basic income from both the guaranteed minimum income and negative income tax proposals. Each of these proposals is means tested: receiving a cash transfer depends on having prior income below some designated threshold. Although the 42 rich receive transfers, basic income will not make the rich richer since, at least given current tax-and-benefit systems, the relatively rich will be paying both for their own basic income as well as that of the poor. 41. Id. at 8-9. 42. A negative income tax is often specified such that each and every individual is entitled to a "demogrant" of a fixed amount. Id. However, depending on the tax schedule, this will operate as a net benefit, in which case the individual receives a refundable credit, or only as a reduction in income tax paid, in which case the individual receives nothing other than the lower tax liability. Thus, as Van Parijs writes, In this sense, existing schemes operate ex post, on the basis of a prior assessment, be it provisional, of the beneficiaries' income. A basic income scheme, instead, operates ex ante, irrespective of any income test. The benefit is given in full to those whose income exceeds the stipulated minimum no less than to those whose income falls short of it. Id. at 9; see also Second, note that workers entitled to overtime are owed compensation that is one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay and not, for example, one-andone-half times the minimum wage. For workers paid on an hourly basis, the 56 regular rate of pay is simply the hourly wage. For workers paid on salary, 57 commission, piece rate, or other basis, the "regular rate is computed by dividing the employee's total weekly remuneration for a workweek by the number of hours actually worked during the week." 58 Third, certain "white collar" employees are exempted from the FLSA's overtime provisions. Although "white collar" is not a phrase used in the FLSA, 59 it is a shorthand, encompassing term for the specific exemptions for executive, administrative, professional, and outside salespersons. There are several 60 rationales for these exemptions. First, hourly compensation and overtime pay were considered inappropriate or incompatible with the middle-and upper-class status associated with these white collar positions. Second, such workers were 61 believed to have sufficient autonomy and bargaining power that they did not require protection from the FLSA. Finally, it was also believed that the nature 62 of this white collar work made it difficult to standardize and spread to other workers.
63

B. Historical Origins of Working-Time Regulation
The history of the FLSA's overtime provisions will inform the evaluative discussion that follows in Part III. "Maximum hours labor standards arose from the 'short hours movements' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The short hours movements were a major source of worker solidarity and growth of the United States labor movement . . . ." The labor movement's struggle for 64 shorter hours was the expression of a desire to "work less and live more"-a 54. 29 U.S. C. § 207 (2012 Several of the American labor movement's bloodiest and most well-known strikes emerged from the short hours movement. In 1886, Samuel Gompers, leader of the predecessor to the American Federation of Labor, called for a nationwide strike to take place on May 1 of that year. The objective of the 66 national strike was to achieve a shorter workweek-"ten hours' pay for eight hours' work." The police violence that occurred during the May 1 strike led to 67 a rally on May 4, 1886, later known as the Haymarket riot or massacre. During 68 the Haymarket riot, several police officers were killed, and several labor movement activists were later convicted and executed. Since then, May 1 has 69 been considered the "international" workers' or labor day around much of the world.
70
Although one initial motive for working-time regulation was shorter hours and greater personal freedom, the onset of the Great Depression, decades after the campaign's initiation and the Haymarket events, created new and additional rationales. The Depression witnessed a dramatic increase in unemployment, and 71 work-time regulation came to be seen as a solution. By shortening working hours, employers would be forced to hire more workers in order to satisfy demanddriven production requirements. Thus, not only could work-hours regulation create more leisure time for workers, but it could also create more work opportunities for those struggling to find a job. ' HOLIDAY, 1886 ' HOLIDAY, -1986 ' HOLIDAY, (1986 
C. Proposals for Reform
It will not be necessary to give a concrete proposal for reforming workinghours regulation. As will be made clearer in the subsequent analysis, what is important is that reform increases workers' opportunity for leisure, contributes to the creation of additional employment, and, despite the reduction in hours worked, it entails little or no reduction in pay, especially for workers at the bottom of the income scale. There are several methods for accomplishing these objectives. As will be illustrated, some particular concerns call for more specific prescriptions.
To give shape to the discussion, this Article will summarize the recommendations of Professor Schor. Professor Schor has been an articulate 79 advocate for reforming and amending the FLSA. She advocates several important changes. Her first proposal is to reduce the standard forty-hour workweek (she envisions instead a thirty-two-hour workweek) and eliminate premium pay for overtime work. In place of premium pay, she would implement a system of 80 compensated time, or "comp time," which would give employees time off at a HOURS FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK 247 (1988) annual raises or could reduce current compensation in exchange for "shorter daily hours, the 'buying' of vacation days, a four-day week, ten-month schedules and sabbaticals."
84
A third area of reform would be to tighten, or even eliminate, the so-called "white collar" exemptions in the FLSA. Schor proposes covering all salaried 85 employees, but allowing employers to exempt some of these employees (the "top 20%" of the workforce), while requiring them to designate an alternative standard of weekly and annual hours for this group (she suggests that employers be free "to set any standard below 60 hours a week and 2880 hours per year"). This 86 proposal would reduce overtime work for salaried employees as well as employer abuse of that designation, while also recognizing the greater flexibility required for high-level, white-collar employees. Schor also proposes legislation to 87 sanction employers who discriminate against employees who express preferences or choose to work shorter hours. Finally, to forestall any reduction in pay, Schor 88 would increase the minimum wage.
III. A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF BASIC INCOME AND WORKING-TIME REGULATION
A. Liberty
One of the main arguments in favor of basic income is that it enhances individual liberty. Van Parijs is perhaps the most articulate representative of this perspective. He argues that "a defensible liberal conception of social justice . . . must maximin . . . people's real freedom, that is, the means they require for the pursuit of their conception of the good life, whatever that is." Van Parijs further 90 argues that "a defensible liberal theory of justice, that is, one that is truly committed to an equal concern for all and to nondiscrimination among conceptions of the good life, does justify, under appropriate factual conditions, that are external to their talents (for instance, land) to achieve their preferred income or living standards. These external resources could be allocated equally 111 among all individuals-and this would constitute one nondiscriminatory means of allocating them. But different individuals-indeed those who prefer more 112 or less leisure-might want more or fewer external resources to achieve their preferred allocation of income and leisure. There is no doubt that a basic income would have a salient impact on the amount of leisure that a significant number of the population would enjoy. But how would it compare with the impact of working-time regulation? The first thing to acknowledge about the basic income proposal is that even if the impact would be significant (along some dimension), it would largely be confined to the lowest-paid workers in the economy. Because a basic income would provide 119 at most a subsistence-level income to everyone, only those individuals who 120 earn subsistence-level incomes or lower would have either the option not to work or the bargaining power to secure a more favorable work-leisure trade-off with employers. All individuals above the subsistence level would see little change in the possibility of enjoying more leisure.
121
In contrast, working-time regulation would affect a substantially larger proportion of the population. Not just subsistence-level workers, but large sections of middle-class workers would also be affected by working-time regulation that limited the number of work hours. This would be particularly true if regulatory reform sought to increase salary thresholds and tighten the exemptions currently applied to white-collar workers. If one then had to choose 122 between policies based on a liberty-enhancing effect on the ability of individuals to pursue greater leisure, working-time regulation is preferred to basic income.
One might object that working-time regulation would be less flexible or 120. Id. 121. For example, in a setup with a 33.33% flat tax and a $6000 basic income, the "break-even point" would be on a yearly salary of $18,000-that is, everyone with a salary above $18,000 would be a net-contributor. Naturally, basic income is often framed as an instrument to counter poverty. In fact, working-time regulation as it exists now-and even more as it is envisioned in reform proposals-gives generous scope to individual preferences. As previously mentioned, the current incarnation of the FLSA does not impose maximum working hours. Rather, it requires additional compensation for hours 125 worked beyond the designated forty per week. Thus, the FLSA does allow 126 flexibility for employees' different preferences over work and leisure to find expression under the regulation. Although many reform proposals seek to abolish overtime compensation, these proposals usually come with alternative means of accommodating employees' various work-leisure preferences. For instance, Schor proposes replacing overtime compensation with "comp time"-the ability to earn additional time off for overtime hours worked. Workers could also trade-off 127 compensation for other forms of time off-vacation, a shorter work year, or even a shorter working career via sabbatical time. All of these possibilities allow for the expression of differing worker preferences for leisure-and they would establish more opportunities than exist under the current FLSA.
To avoid paternalism, we should permit workers latitude to divide their time between work and leisure. Yet one should also recall the-very likely-socially determined nature of work preferences. gives rise to expenditure arms races focused on positional goods-those for which relative position matters most. The result is to divert resources from nonpositional goods, causing welfare losses.").
134. Bowles & Park, supra note 130, at F398. 135. In addition to analogizing "relative consumption externalities" to an "arms race," they can also be described as "positional externalities." See Robert H. Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Positional Externalities, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1777 (2008) ("Before addressing whether the harm caused by positional externalities should be mitigated by legislation, it is useful to review the conditions under which such externalities can be expected to cause harm in the first place. Those conditions are precisely analogous to the ones that make military arms races between equally matched rival nations wasteful."). On the implications for positional externalities and the law generally, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992).
136. Relative consumption externalities can therefore be considered among the class of "market failures" for which government intervention is justified in economic theory. See Frank, supra note 130, at 140 (writing that the economics "profession has incorporated numerous other forms of market failure into its arsenal of policy recommendations").
137. work-leisure preferences vary across individuals-requiring flexibility in the regulation policy-the fact of relative-consumption effects justifies the reduction of working time for all workers. This addresses to a significant extent the one-140 size-does-not-fit-all objection. The conclusion is that while basic income would certainly expand the scope for leisure in society, this opportunity will only be available to some of the lowest paid workers. Basic income will do nothing to increase availability of leisure time for broad sections of middle-and even upper-class workers. On the other hand, working-time regulation can do much more to make the choice of leisure time a more tangible option for many of these workers. Working-time regulation can therefore do better than basic income in expanding freedom-literally making free time more abundant for more people.
B. Equality
Another lauded benefit of basic income is that it can have a salient effect on the reduction of income inequality. Set at a high enough level, basic income could end poverty at a stroke. The tax financing of basic income can be made advocates have pointed out, the fact that rich and poor alike receive basic income does not mean that "a basic income would make both rich and poor richer than before," nor that a basic income would increase income inequality. For 144 example, if basic income were funded through a progressive income tax, "it is clear the comparatively rich would need to pay both for their own basic income and for much of the basic income of the comparatively poor." Financing basic 145 income through such a mechanism can make it significantly redistributive.
146
Significantly, however, basic income can be financed through alternative means in ways that make its redistributive impact slight. But just how egalitarian is basic income? Does it achieve everything that an egalitarian would desire? And how does the egalitarian impact of a basic income compare to that of working-time regulation? In this section, this Article argues that basic income has significant shortcomings in addressing egalitarian concerns. These shortcomings include not only failing to deliver everything that an egalitarian might want, but also undermining key egalitarian objectives. In contrast, working-time regulation does much better at satisfying egalitarian principles.
Note first that if the sole purpose of basic income were to reduce poverty or maximin income, it would clearly fail. As already admitted, some conditional income transfer program could probably achieve this objective much more effectively. Hence, the deeper case for basic income rests on an argument about 149 maximinning, in Van Parijs' version, "real freedom." Yet even this more 150 sophisticated argument is subject to criticism. As described in the previous section, this particular philosophical defense of basic income has its roots in John Rawls' political philosophy and in particular with his principles of equality.
151
Elizabeth Anderson refers to this conception of equality as "luck egalitarianism" or "equality of fortune." She contends that this conception of equality fails a 152 basic test that any egalitarian philosophy should meet: "that its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens." is that luck egalitarianism deprives some citizens of enjoying what she calls "the social conditions of freedom" on the grounds-incorrect, she argues-that they are at fault for losing them. According to luck egalitarianism, the "fundamental 156 aim of equality is to compensate people for undeserved bad luck-being born with poor native endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities, suffering from accidents and illness, and so forth." But following this principle 157 to its logical conclusion can lead to some disturbing results. Anderson's strongest example is dependent caretakers. These include individuals, most often women, 158 who choose to care for others (children, the aged, or the ill or infirm) but who fairly narrow bounds for a modest basic income. But the higher its level, the higher the average rate of income tax and therefore the greater the redistribution from the comparatively rich to the comparatively poor.").
149. But if the lazy surfer is the paradigmatic beneficiary of basic income, is it the representative one? Many-if not most-recipients of basic income are unlikely to be lazy surfers or starving artists. Instead, unlike these convention-crashing iconoclasts, most recipients of basic income would prefer to become "productive" and "contributing" members of society. What would basic income mean to them? Unfortunately, for these individuals, basic income may well have the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, inequality.
Consider Anderson's humorously hypothetical, but illustrative, example of the communicative effects of public compensation:
To the stupid and untalented: Unfortunately, other people don't value what little you have to offer in the system of production. Your talents are too meager to command much market value. Because of the misfortune that you were born so poorly endowed with talents, we productive ones will make it up to you: we'll let you share in the bounty of what we have produced with our vastly superior and highly valued abilities.
171
For many proponents, basic income is supposed to avoid these more-or-less explicit or implicit judgments because of its universality. This particular feature 172 of basic income will be discussed in more detail below. But it is hard to 173 imagine basic income not having the judgmental effects Anderson describes. Although all citizens receive basic income, there would be little doubt about who would be the net beneficiaries and the net contributors of the scheme. Thus, on the principles underlying basic income, "People lay claim to the resources of egalitarian redistribution in virtue of their inferiority to others, not in virtue of their equality to others." By simply giving cash to the poor, basic income in 174 effect tells net beneficiaries that they have nothing to offer society. Basic income is thus a kind of bread and circuses for the twenty-first century.
Rather than basic income, net beneficiaries may well prefer the kinds of public goods and specific assistance traditionally associated with the welfarestate. Most specifically in this case, these goods would include those such as education, vocational training, unemployment insurance, and so forth. Such 175 goods make possible the integration of individuals into the normal and expected practices of society. Unlike basic income, the justification for these goods is grounded in equality: They recognize the possible contributions of all members of society and equip or sustain them to be equal (in some measure) participants. Eduardo Porter nicely summarizes this sentiment:
[R]eplacing everything in the safety net with a check would limit the scope of government assistance in damaging ways. Say we know the choice of neighborhood makes a difference to the development of poor In contrast to basic income, the effects of working-hours regulation are substantially more egalitarian. First, working-hours regulation integrates work and leisure by providing more opportunities for free time to those in paid employment. This is in contrast to basic income, which is premised on and engenders the potential division of the population into working and nonworking. Working-time regulation makes leisure more widely available, rather than confining it to those who work at a subsistence level. Thus, all get to enjoy leisure. The rich already have leisure-or work in professions that are intrinsically rewarding. And working-time regulation increases the leisure-time opportunities for both the poor and middle class. Further, as will be discussed subsequently, working-hours regulation can increase employment opportunities and makes work more widely abundant as well. In sharp contrast to basic income, therefore, working time regulation ameliorates rather than exacerbates the basic social division between working and nonworking populations.
Working-time regulation has at least two other egalitarian effects worth mentioning. The first is that it can reduce gender inequalities. Although women have made significant advancement by entering into more careers and professions, they lag behind men in pay. As has also been documented, women 177 still tend to do more of the housework at home than do men. These two facts 178 are related. Sharing more of the household burden limits women's participation in the market economy. These limits make it more difficult for women to advance in their careers or undertake more demanding professions. Indeed, countries with shorter workweeks rank highly in terms of gender equality.
In particular, 179 government-funded paid paternity leave-which certainly can be included as kind of working-time regulation-can make a salient difference. In countries with these policies, men that take advantage of them do more domestic work than otherwise.
180
It seems likely that if more free time allows men to share more of the household work, then working-time regulation will reduce gender inequality.
181
To be clear, the gender equality effects are uncertain. For instance, Juliet Schor recognizes that although her proposals "are gender-neutral," " [w] [i]f men take considerably more responsibility for children and housework-as many now say they want to-then they too will want to opt for working patterns that are compatible with family duties." This ambiguity is one reason the 183 reform of working-time regulation should take the form, in at least some amount, of parental leave including some mandatory portion for fathers. Thus the form of policy can itself encourage a shift in gender roles.
There is also an association between income inequality and the length of working hours. The previous section discussed the problem of relativeconsumption effects: Conspicuous consumption-keeping up with the Joneses-causes people to spend more time working than enjoying leisure. In 184 fact, this effect is stronger when income inequality is higher-when the Joneses become even richer than the rest of us. As the economists Samuel Bowles and Yongjin Park have shown, "Data on work hours in ten countries over the period show that greater inequality is indeed associated [with] longer work hours." As also discussed previously, work-time regulation can be a way to 185 counter this welfare-reducing effect of inequality.
There is a concern that many poor workers would be unable to take advantage of working-time regulation. "The poorest third would work just as many hours as ever-or more, as more work became available . . . ." Those who gain free 186 time would be mostly middle class. This is why it is essential, as mentioned previously, that further reductions in working time come with little or no loss in pay.
There are several methods to achieve this. Perhaps the most 187 188 straightforward is an increase in the minimum wage. As Schor explains, "While only a limited fraction of workers receive the minimum, when it rises, it creates upward pressure on those wages which are somewhat higher. of low-wage labor will also create pressure for employers to raise wages to fill job vacancies. And this second effect will also reduce income inequality. Third, 192 both rising wages and an increased number of jobs will reduce unemployment and increase labor-force participation. Because unemployment and underemployment are important drivers of inequality, this third set of effects will reduce income inequality. Most critically, because these effects increase 193 participation of the lowest earners in paid work, the consequences are much more egalitarian-in the deeper, social and cultural sense just discussed-than is the case with basic income. To summarize, whatever egalitarian effects of basic income on economic inequality, it may well be miniscule in terms of a broader sense of social and political inequality. In contrast, working-time regulation will not only have salient, mitigating effects on economic and gender inequalities, but it fosters broader participation in the economy and society that reduce these same, deeper social inequalities.
C. Technological Unemployment
Many proponents of basic income favor it because it addresses a possible impending social dilemma: the creation of mass unemployment because of changes in technology. In this view, technology is creating (or will create) massive disruption in the work place, potentially abolishing the need for employed work. But this change presents an enormous social problem: what to 194 do with all of the unemployed people? The answer, according to some, is basic income, which provides a guaranteed means of existence independent of paid 191. Economic studies of the effects of working-hours regulation on unemployment rates are ambiguous. See, e.g., Arie Kapteyn et al., The Myth of Worksharing, 11 LAB. ECON. 293, 293 (2004) (reviewing the "most pertinent theoretical and recent empirical contributions to the literature" and finding that "a positive direct effect on employment of a reduction of working hours" but that "taking into account indirect effects, in particular the upward effects on wages, [they] find that the long-run effect becomes small and insignificant"); Jennifer Hunt, Has WorkSharing Worked in Germany?, 114 Q. J. ECON. 117 (1999) 196 In response to this argument, it is first worth pointing out that the prospect of technological unemployment may be a nonproblem. How much technology is changing productivity and employment is a matter of considerable debate. Indeed, according to some prominent economists, the rate of productivity growth has slowed down, almost to a standstill. If this is true, technological change is 197 unlikely to produce massive unemployment. Low productivity growth creates social challenges of its own, including the ability to reduce income inequality. Basic income may still have some useful policy purpose in this case, but addressing mass unemployment is not one of them. In this section, this Article focuses on that particular problem.
Let's assume for the sake of discussion that massive, technology-induced unemployment is a serious problem. Basic income, under a kind of luckegalitarian rationale, would seem to be the perfect solution. Technology has 198 rendered large numbers of people unemployable, for reasons that are completely beyond their control. Basic income would give such individuals a means of sustaining themselves, and this is justified in view of the fact that they are "victims" of brute luck.
But is basic income really the perfect solution to mass unemployment? Consider again working-hours regulation. One early rationale for hours regulation-and a continuing one, especially in light of the mass-unemployment argument-is that it can reduce unemployment. By reducing the number of 199 hours any individual employee can work, employers will find it necessary to hire additional employees to meet the shortfall in production. hours regulation can also address the unemployment problem to which basic income presents itself as an answer.
D. Transforming Work
Transforming the workplace-making it more humane, equitable, and democratic-has long been an egalitarian aspiration of the left. For a tradition 203 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:473 of the Marxist, socialist, or anarchist left, this aspiration is fundamental.
204
According to these perspectives, not only is it important to reduce economic inequality, but it is also crucial to remove the exploitation and domination that accompanies the exchange of labor in a capitalist market economy.
205
Exploitation constitutes a kind of unfairness: Some individuals (capitalists) profit from the labor of others (workers). Likewise, domination is both unequal and Only under such conditions would society be able to end exploitation and domination, as well as economic inequality.
210
Perhaps for this reason, left-leaning scholars were initially skeptical of proposals for basic income. Writing in response to Robert van der Veen and Philippe Van Parijs, Erik Olin Wright contended that "some form of social 211 ownership of the principal means of production is essential for the development and reproduction" of the kind of society for which they believed basic income would be sufficient.
Basic income would be neither economically nor 212 politically feasible without extensive capital controls and therefore substantial steps toward socialist property institutions.
213
Nevertheless, and rather avowedly, basic-income proposals make no effort to transform the workplace-at least not directly. In contrast to the socialist left, 204. Id.
Erik Olin Wright explains the injustice of exploitation and domination (what he terms, alienation) in this way:
In the Marxist tradition, two of the central indictments of capitalism stem from this class relation: first, workers are exploited because they must work harder and longer for capitalists than is needed simply to provide for their own standard of living; and second, they are alienated because they enter into employment relations within which they are deprived of power over both their laboring activities and the fruits of that activity. nothing more than a cash transfer, basic income at most changes only background conditions of the labor market. Otherwise, labor markets are left untouched and basic income works solely through public institutions. This feature of basic income is also quite consonant with other features of Rawlsian political philosophy from which luck egalitarianism takes its source.
215
Several features of Rawlsian philosophy indicate that public policy should be enacted through and apply only to public institutions. For instance, Rawls 216 wrote,
[O]nce a suitable minimum is provided by transfers, it may be perfectly fair that the rest of total income be settled by the price system . . . . Moreover, this way of dealing with the claims of need would appear to be more effective than trying to regulate income by minimum wage standards, and the like. It is better to assign to each branch only such tasks as are compatible with one another. Since the market is not suited to answer the claims of need, these should be met by a separate arrangement. 217 Rawls also says that the Difference Principle applies only to the basic structure of society. Although Rawls is not always precise about his meaning 218 of the basic structure, one "widespread interpretation" is as follows: The basic 219 structure of a society is defined by "the provisions of its constitution, in such specific legislation as may be required to implement those provisions, and in further legislation and policy which are of central importance but which resist formulation in the constitution itself." On this view of justice, the scheme just 220 laid out-public policy enacted solely through public institutions, while leaving private economic action unencumbered-therefore becomes quite appropriate. Indeed, restricting the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure yields directly such a "division of labor" in society. In a market society, individuals maximize their self-interest through exchange, while a Rawlsian state selects a maximinning tax function that maximizes the amount of primary goods (or whatever is to be maximinned) going to the least well off. 221 Moreover, there is a sharper conclusion one can draw from this view of the proper allocation of public policy. In this argument, basic income is superior to There is a market economy in which all agents seek to maximize their own gains, and there is a Rawlsian state that selects a tax function on income that maximizes the income return to the worst off people . . . . "). [Vol. 50:473 working-hours regulation precisely because it respects this division between private market exchange and public redistribution. That is, public policy should not invade the market because this site should be left to individuals to bargain and contract on their own. In the case of basic income and working-hours regulation, this view implies the kind of evaluation that we encountered-and rejected-earlier. This evaluation is that basic income is more conducive to individual freedom than working-hours regulation. Basic income respects the right of each individual to decide-to contract-for herself about how much and even whether she should work. Basic income corrects for the inequalities created in the market while also respecting this freedom to contract. Working-hours regulation, on the other hand, seeks to remedy these inequalities directly, but at the cost of individual choice. Other arguments can be made in favor of a relatively strict separation between market freedom and government redistribution, including efficiency arguments. I responded to the basic argument earlier and responses to other arguments can be found elsewhere.
However, the recognition that basic income would have significant, if indirect, impacts on the employment relationship has made friends out of former critics of basic income. Erik Olin Wright, one of these former critics, wrote that "[a] generous, unconditional basic income which would allow employees a meaningful exit option from the employment relation directly transforms the character of power within the class relations of capitalist society." For one, 222 basic income would allow people to engage in "non-commodified forms of socially productive activity," such as care-giving labor, art, politics, and community service. In addition, basic income would give individuals a more 223 "realistic" exit option from the labor market, which would increase their bargaining power with respect to employers. It is worth emphasizing again that 224 such bargaining power could be used to change any term in the employment contract upon which the employer and employee agree (and that is legally permissible). And indeed, certainly one term open for negotiation is the number 225 of working hours and the extent of leisure time. Finally, Wright also argues that basic income could have other salient effects on workers' power within the employment relationship, such as the contribution to an increase in union density. Thus, basic income can substantially alter the balance of class power 226 in a society and therefore indirectly change the terms of the employment relationship.
Yet if it is desirable to transform the employment relationship, why not 222. Wright, supra note 205, at 91-100. 223. Id. at 95. 224. Id. at 95-96. 225. Recall the discussion in Part III.A. 226. The argument for higher union density is as follows: Employers may prefer to bargain with unions only in tight labor markets. In tight labor markets, there is pressure to increase wages and a labor union-especially a centralized one-can contain this wage pressure within reasonable bounds. By contributing to a tighter labor market, basic income could then encourage employers to be more accepting of labor unions.
2017]
BETTER THAN BASIC INCOME? 503 simply do it directly, such as through working-time regulation? Moreover, if this is to be done, can it be normatively justified? Or does Rawls' restriction of the scope of the Difference Principle to society's basic structure disqualify such an attempt? Before directly comparing basic income and working-time regulation, I will first discuss the normative legitimacy of workplace regulation. Although Rawls says that his principles of justice apply only to the basic structure of society, it is "seriously unclear which institutions are supposed to qualify as part of the basic structure." For example, one can find no argument 227 why the basic structure would not include the public, legally enforceable rules that govern private organizations, such as the family or business firms. In Cohen's interpretation, the basic structure is the "broad coercive outline" of society that would include all legal rules governing such organizations. If 228 working-hours legislation, by itself or in conjunction with other legal rules, were necessary to maximin the primary goods or real freedom of the least well off, there does not appear to be any Rawlsian principle that would exclude such an option.
Rawls also says that "the market is not suited to answer the claims of need." One interpretation of the words "not suited" is that it is more efficient 229 to redistribute (or maximin) through government transfers rather than through market institutions. Although without referencing Rawls, such an argument is made by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.
They argue that because 230 redistribution through legal rules is just as distortionary as the tax system, it would be better to choose only efficient legal rules and redistribute only through taxes and transfers. transform the workplace, then basic income could possibly do more than working-hours regulation alone because the greater bargaining power supported by a basic income could be used to enhance any feature of the workplace in favor of the employee. But if the goal were to transform the workplace, working 237 hours regulation could simply be a part of a larger set of legal rules (or a regime of collective bargaining) that could most certainly transform the workplace more extensively than basic income alone.
E. Universality
Another feature of basic income that is frequently cited in its favor is its universality. Under a basic income proposal, every person would receive a 238 transfer, whether rich or poor. Because it is universal, it has been assumed that 239 basic income would not have the stigma associated with traditional, means-tested welfare programs.
The absence of stigma would have several salient 240 consequences. First, the lack of stigma alone can be thought to benefit the poor insofar as they do not have to bear the social opprobrium associated with poverty programs. Second, the take-up rate for basic income would be higher than for 241 means-tested programs (and a higher take-up reduces the rate of poverty).
242
Third, because of its universality, basic income is claimed to be more politically sustainable. For instance, Eduardo Porter writes that basic income "would be politically secure. Programs for the poor are often maligned as poor programs. Indeed, defunding antipoverty programs rarely carries political consequences because the poor rarely vote. It's another story entirely when everyone benefits."
243
There is some limited evidence that universal benefits receive greater public support, although the case is neither strong nor clear-cut. However, even reasons. In the first instance, such goods are of more value to the rich than is simple cash. Well-funded public schooling-either primary, secondary, or tertiary-may be the best example of a publicly provided, universal good that is supported by rich and poor alike. Education is valued by the rich-if the state provides high-quality schooling then it will find widespread support. The same goes for other universal public goods-pensions, healthcare, and even unemployment insurance. The same cannot be said for a tax-funded basic income. Why do the rich need cash? Why not simply reduce the taxes that the rich pay?
The difference between a public good and a transfer also matters because it is a way of disguising redistribution. When taxes are used to fund public goods available to all, each citizen has access to the good on equal terms. But what appears as access to goods on open and equal terms actually conceals a vast amount of redistribution. With a progressive tax system, the rich not only pay 249 for the education of their children, but subsidize the education of the poor as well. Similarly, although benefits such as social security are dependent on one's income and work history, the dispersion in transfers is typically smaller than the inequality in market (that is, pre-tax, pre-transfer) 255. The connection between work and health insurance can certainly be questioned. Perhaps this is why universal health insurance has been so difficult to achieve in the United States where the norm of deservingness is perhaps strongest.
256. Porter, supra note 10 ("Being universal-that is, for the homeless and the masters of the universe alike-the program would be free of the cumbersome assessments required to determine eligibility. It would also escape the stigma typically attached to programs for the poor. In the aspects discussed here, working-time regulation would much more easily fulfill the requirements of a universal benefit. First, as already discussed, the consequences of working-time regulation-more leisure-would be available to a much broader portion of the population. This feature will engender broader support among the population-to the extent this effect exists. Second, the benefit is quite explicitly tied to work. Indeed, the reduction of hours of working time is only available to those who work. Working-time regulation is thus an earned benefit, available to those who contribute.
F. Efficiency
Another attribute often cited in favor of basic income is its efficiency. Advocates of basic income thus view this feature as a major benefit. Van Parijs in particular refers to the distortionary problem of welfare policy as the "unemployment trap," and writes that " [t] he abolition of the means test, as we have seen, is intimately linked to the removal of the unemployment trap." To 277 be sure, as all would acknowledge, distortions on the tax side would continue to exist, but these prevail under existing policy in any case.
Despite these efficiency advantages, basic income also has the potential to generate quite significant inefficiencies, as well. While, in the substitution effect, basic income makes work relatively more valuable than leisure, basic income has an additional effect, called the income effect. ("Besides changing the marginal reward to working, most taxes make you poorer, and when people are poorer, they tend to cut back at least a bit on all the things they value, including leisure.").
280. This is on the assumption that leisure is a normal good, defined as one that increases with income (or wealth). If leisure were an inferior good, the amount of leisure would decrease as income increases.
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INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:473 an increase in income, people will need to work less to satisfy their consumption preferences. Even more intuitively, why would anyone work if the government 281 provides her with a no-strings-attached income? Thus, by reducing the incentive to work, basic income may also worsen economic efficiency, causing output to drop beneath its optimal level.
282
Whether basic income improves efficiency (via the substitution effect) or worsens efficiency (via the income effect) is an empirical question. And, with only limited research to bring to bear on this issue, it is difficult to definitively answer. Nevertheless, two points are worth observing. First, advocates face a dilemma when arguing on efficiency grounds. On the one hand, advocates tend to minimize the concern raised by the income effect. They will point to studies that support their view that basic income does not discourage people from working. On the other hand, advocates are much more enthusiastic about 283 abolishing means testing and encouraging work along the lines of the substitution effect. But because both substitution and income effects are economic decisions 284 made by the same individuals, it seems unlikely that advocates can have it both ways. Either substitution and income effects will both be salient or they will both not be.
The second point relates to the level of basic income. And in this case again, advocates are caught in a thorny dilemma. Clearly, the level of the basic income will have some effect on work incentives. At a high enough level, most people will continue to work in only the most intrinsically rewarding jobs. Conversely, at a sufficiently low level, we would expect work incentives to be only marginally affected. At the same time, the benefits of basic income are precisely the opposite. Basic income is most liberating at its most generous level, while least at its lowest level. Basic income, therefore, faces some difficult trade-offs. 285 We can now address the efficiency issues of working-time regulation. The first thing to note is that administrating working-time regulation also entails costs. The primary costs will be those of inspection and enforcement-the same types of costs as currently exist under the FLSA. How large these costs are depends 286 partly on how effective the government and the public want the policy to be-a 281. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 266, at 122 ("Because the belt tightening of taxes causes people to cut back on leisure, it causes people to work more than otherwise.") (emphasis in original). Conversely, an increase in income will cause individuals to increase leisure and reduce work.
282. Most studies will show a minor decline in work effort. example, union activities are funded by member-paid union dues), their proximity to workers and the workplace gives them better access to information, which significantly lowers the cost of enforcement. These features may make the 289 enforcement of working-hours regulation cheaper than the administration of basic income.
Both basic income and working-time regulation, therefore, entail administrative costs, and it is not entirely clear nor obvious which is cheaper in these terms. As such, neither constitutes a clearly superior policy choice.
However, the comparison is clearer when we consider other kinds of economic efficiency. First, note that if labor markets are perfectly competitive, any attempt to regulate working hours will be inefficient.
But with any 290 departure from such a scenario, and in particular any imperfections in the way working time is set, then there is scope for policy to increase efficiency. The 291 question, then, is just how competitive labor markets are. At first glance, they would seem to be very competitive. Labor is relatively mobile, and therefore few employers can exercise monopsony power. W orkers are typically free to sell 292 their labor to several different employers. But even with many potential buyers, there can exist substantial market imperfections-which can give employers a kind of de facto monopsony power. When this is the case, employers will have an incentive to set the length 289. Enforcement of various kinds of labor laws depend on the presence of a union at the workplace. See, e.g., David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 20 (1991) (finding unionized firms were "more likely to receive safety and health inspections, face greater scrutiny in the course of those inspections, and pay higher penalties for violating health and safety standards than comparable nonunion establishments").
290. This follows from the so-called first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which says that when markets are complete, any competitive equilibrium is necessarily Pareto optimal. ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 308 (1995) . In this scenario, no regulation can make any Pareto superior change.
291. See id. at 308-09 (listing the departures from perfect competition-market failures-that justify Pareto-improving market interventions).
292. Whereas "monopoly" means "one seller," "monopsony" means "one buyer." 293. The White House's Council of Economic Advisers recently issued a policy brief discussing the sources of labor market monopsony to explain rising income inequality-both between workers and between firms and workers. Sources of monopsony power in the labor market include: (1) market concentration among firms, (2) employer collusion, (3) employer use of non-
